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The paper contains an investigation of the effects of systematic under-
reporting of income and of sample selectivity on the estimated levels of two
subjective definitions of poverty: the so-called subjective poverty line and
the Leyden poverty line. Both problems turn out to have substantially bias-
ing effects. Methods are presented that remedy the biases. The resulting
adjusted poverty lines prove to be quite accurate. Furthermore, suggestions
are made for the design of questionnaires that are used in the surveys on
which these poverty definitions are based.1
1. Introduction
Whatever poverty definition one adheres to, a proper implementation is
prerequisite for its possible use in social policy. In this paper we pay at-
tention to s number of inethodological issues that arise in the empirical
implementation of certain subjective definitions of poverty. In particular,
we are concerned with the so-called subjective poverty line (SPL) and Leyden
poverty line (LPL), which have been introduced and discussed in a string of
papers by, mainly, Dutch and American authors (see references). Both ap-
proaches are subjective in that they are based on responses to survey
questions which try to elicit either e respondent's evaluation of income
levels or his judgment about oinimum needs. Furthermore, both npproachss are
model based, in the sense that the responses themselves do not generate
poverty lines imnediately. One needs to estimate a model that explains in-
terhousehold variation in the responses to the survey questions. These two
aspects identify two crucial methodological issues in the implementation of
the SPL and LPL: the responses should measure what they are supposed to
measure and the model should be correctly specified and estimated.
In this paper we present some empirical evidence on the sensitivity of
the poverty line definitions to systematic biases in the responses and to an
incorrect estimation method for the model. The systematic response bias is a
result of the rather general tendency of respondents to underestimate their
own after tax household income. The incorrect estimation method stems from a
disregard of sample selectivity due to partial non-response.
In Section 2 we briefly explain the SPL and LPL and we discuss and es-
timate the model that is assumed to generate the responses. We point out
some implausible outcomes.
In Section 3, we present evidencs that respondents severely underes-
timate their after tax household income, which results in a downward bias of
the poverty lines. We also present a method to correct this bias. In Section
4 we take up the problem of selectivity bias. It turns out that selectivity
is a statistically significant problem. In Section 5 we compare the poverty
lines that result from the various models. Both the income correction and
the correction for sample selectivity bias lead to sizable changes in the
estimated level of the poverty line.2
In Section 6 we draw conclusions from our findings for the design of
questionnaires used in the empirical work that underlies the subjective
poverty line definitions considered here. All in all, the problems con-
sidered can be remedied rather easily.
2. Two subjective definitions of poverty and their implementation
The so-called subjective poverty line (SPL) is based on the following
survey question, posed to the head of the household:
"Which after tax monthly income do you, in your Absolutely minimal
circumstances, consider to be absolutely minimal? per month ~...
That is to say that with less you could not make
ends meet". don't know
A respondent's answer to this minimum income question (MIQ) will be referred
to as his minimum income Ymin' It turns out that
Ymin
depends on the respon-
dent's actual after tax income and a number of other factors, including
family composition. See, for instance, Kapteyn, Van de Geer, Van de Stadt
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1) In this paper "income" is always after tax household income.3
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Fig. 2.1 The subjective poverty line
the SPL, as it is the point where families can just make ends meet; with
~
less income they cannot make ends meet and with more income than
Ymin
they
can. Since the position of the funetion f(y;x) depends on x, it is clear
from (2.2), and from Fig. 2.1 that the SPL depends on x. That is, if
families have different characteristics they will require different amounts
of money to make ends meet.
The Leyden poverty line (LPL) is based on the so-called íncome evalua-
tion question (IEQ):
"Which after tax monthly income very bad ~...
would you, in your circumstances, bad ~...
consider to be very bad? And bad? insufficient ~...
Insufficient? Sufficient? Good? sufficient ~ ...
Nery good? good ~ ...
very good ~ ...
(we mean after tax household income)A respondent's answers to the IEQ are used to estimate his welfare function
of income (WFI). The measurement method is illustrated in Fíg. 2.2.
ui~~
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Fig. 2.2 The Leyden poverty line
The verbal labels "very good", "good", etc. have been identified with
mid-points of the six equal intervals on a zero-one scale. In this way the
verbal evaluations have been transformed into numerical evaluations. (For
details and justification see Van Praag [1971], Van Praag and Kapteyn
[1973], Kapteyn [1977]). The response to the IEQ can now be represented by a
scatter of six points. According to Van Praag [1968] the relation between an
income level z and its numerical evaluation on a zero-one scale, U(z), can
be approximated quite well by a lognormal distribution funetion:
(2.3) u(z) m n(z.u~a)~
where A(.,u~a) is the lognormal distribution function with median eu and
log-variance o2. The parameters u and o of a respondent are estimated by5
fitting a lognormal function through the scatter of points in (z,U(z))-
space, as illustrated in Fig. 2.2. Van Praag and Kapteyn [1973] and Van
Eierwaarden and Kapteyn [1981] provide further details.
The estimated lognormal distribution function represents the respon-
dent's WFI. The quantity eN is a location parameter, it is the income level
which is evaluated at 0.5 by the individual; a is a slope parameter. The
evaluation of an income z, by an individual with welfare parameters u and a
is given by
lnz-
(2.4) U(z) - A(z;u,a) - N(lnz;u,a) - N(á;0,1),
where N(.;u,a) is the normal distribution function with mean u and variance
2
a .
The LPL is based on the notion that poverty i s a state of low utility.
If the WFI is taken as a cardinal utility function of income, someone is
defined as poor, if his income y is such that
(2.5) U(Y) 5 a.
where a is a"welfare level" (a number between zero and one), which has to
be set by politicians. Let us define ua by
(2.6) A(ua;0,1) - N(1nua;0,1) - a,
ttieii according to the LPL someone is poor if his income y satisfies
(2,7) ln` .L~ 5 u
a a
or
(2.8) Y á exP(u;o.ua)
It turns out that the parameters u and a both depend on a vector of family
characteristics x. Thus, just like the SPL, the LPL also depends on x.6
2.1. The Model
To make the SPL and LPL operational we have to specify the relation be-
tween Ymin' u and a on the one hand and the vector of household
characteristics x on the other hand. The explanation of u and a is derived
from a"theory of preference formation" developed in Kapteyn [19~~]; see,
for example, Van de Stadt, Kapteyn, Van de Geer [1985] (SKG hereafter) and
Kapteyn, Van de Geer, Van de Stadt [1985J (KGS hereafter) for details.
Estimation of the complete model requires panel data. Only cross section
data are available, however, for our analysis. Therefore all lagged ex-
planatory variables in the model are ignored. The resulting specification
for u is
(2.9) Nn - ~Gt ~lÍl-~2)lnfsni ~2lnynt ~3(mn- ~lhsn) t En,
where pn is the value of u for family n, fsn is the size of family n, yn is
its after tax income, mn is mean log-income in the reference group of
household n, hsn is mean log-family size in the reference group of household
n, en is an error term cnpturing all omitted factorsl). Since un is an in-
dicator of the level of financisl wants of a family, equation (2.9) says
that a family's financial wants are determined by its income, family size
and by the geometric mean of incomes in the reference group, adjusted for
the geometric mean of family sizes in the reference Qroup.
The theory of preference formation mentioned above implies that an is
determined by the dispersion of incomes and family sizes in family n's
reference group, both present and past, and by the variability of past in-
comes of famíly n. Although this dependency raises various interesting
policy issues (see KGS) we will ignore it here for simplicity's sake.
1) Equation (2.9) can be obtained from (22) in KGS by omitting all lagged
variables on the right side.7
Empirically, this amounts to taking the dispersion of incomes and family
sizes as given and dealing with the observed variation of o across families
as being determined exogenously. Furthermore, as a appears to be uncorre-
lated with the explanatory variables on the right hand side of (2.9), we
take a as exogenous and for the purpose of constructing a poverty line ac-
cording to (2.8) we set a equal to its sample mean a.
The explanation of the logarithm of Ymin
is based on a similar
specification as the explanation of u:
(2.10) lnymin,n- a0 ` oi(1-a2)lnfsn} a2lnynt a3(mn- alhsn) t un,
where un is an error term, possibly correlated with en in (2.9).
The specification of the influence of family size so far is primitive
for two reasons. First, it is restrictive to simply count the number of
family members without regard for their ages. Therefore, lnfsn is redefined
as follows:
I
(2.11) lnfsn :- ~~1 w~f(a~),
where In is the number of persons in family n; w1-1 and
(2.12) u~~ :- ln(.)I(~-1)), j-2.....In:
(2.13) f(a~) :- 1. a~~18
f(a~) :- 1 t Y2(18-a~)241'3(18-a~)2(36ta~) osa~sl8,
so that the age function is a third degree polynomial for a~518, with
f(18)-1, f'(18)-0; 72 and 73 are parameters, which have to be estimated.
Thus, the logarithmic weighting of family members has been retained but in
addition children under 18 are also weighted on the basis of their
age. Second, both (2.9) and (2.10) specify the cost of an increase in family8
size as a fixed percentage of income irrespective of the level of this in-
come ( see below). For example, i f a baby costs 15x of household i ncome at a
very low income level, then ( 2.9) and ( 2.10) imply that it will also cost
15z of household income at a much higher income level. A simple way to relax
this restriction is to replace ~1 by ~lt dlnyn and al by alt ~Vlnyn, as will
become clear shortly. If the snme adjustment is carried through for the
family size in the reference group, this yields
(2.13) un - ROt ~1(1-~2)lnfsnt d(1-~2)lnfsnlnynt ~21nyn
t p3mn - p3Rlhsn- p38mnhsnt en,
with lnfsn defined by (2.11). The expression for
lnymin,n
is analogous:
(2.14) lnymin,n - a0 } al(1-a2)lnfsnt ~4(1-a2)lnfsnlnyn } a2lnyn
. a3mn - a3alhsn - a3ymnhsn} un
Once the parameters in (2.13) and (2.14) are known, we have our opera-
tional version of the LPL and the SPL. With respect to the LPL we note that
the poverty line corresponding to a welfare level a is óiven by (substitute
(2.13) in (2.7)):
~Ot~l(1-a2)lnfsnta3on-a3d mnhsn-a3alhsntaua
(2.15) LPL(a) - exP (1-b2)(1-dlnfsn) ~
The SPL is given by (substitute (2.14) in (2.2)):
a0ta1(1-a2)lnfsnta3mn-a3tl~ mnhsn-a3alhsn
(2.16) SPL - exp (1-a2)(1-~ylnfsn)
The error terms cn and un have been ignored in the derivation of (2.15) and
(2.16) .9
Both poverty lines depend on the family composition and on the dis-
tribution of incomes and family compositions in a family's reference group.
If ó and y are eyual to zero, i t is clear from (2.15) und ( 2.16) that both
poverty lines increase proportionally with (redefined) family size. For the
LPL this is restrictive for the following reason.
The dependence of the LPL on family size defines equivalence scales
(cf. e.g., Kapteyn and Van Prasg [1976, 1980]), which tell us how family in-
come has to vary with family composition in order to keep the family at
welfare level a. Proportionality implies that in order to compensate for the
birth of s baby, for example, it takes the same percentage of family income
for both a very high welfare level a(and hence a high income prior to the
birth of the baby) and a very low welfare level a(with a corresponding low
income prior to the birth of the baby). It is more likely, however, that the
cost of a baby for a richer family is a higher amount but a smaller propor-
ti~n of income, than for a poorer family. For dCO, this is generally what
the modcl implies ( see Section 5).
2.2. Preliminary empirical results
Models (2.13) and (2.14) have been estimated for a sample of 773
households taken from the Dutch population in 1982. This so-called labor
mobility survey only samples families whose head is under 65. In other
respects the sample is random. Table 2.1. presents some of the estimation
results that have been obtained with the LISREL-V maximum likelihood com-
puter program.10
Table 2.1. First estimatíon results (standard errors in parentheses)a)
equation (2.13) equation (2.14)
~1- 31.07 (22.05) á1- 18.64 (11.33)
~2- 0.89 (0.06) á2- 0.85 (0.07)
á - -2.98 (2.11) s - -1.79 (1.03)
T2- 10.11"10-2(2.17'10-2)
T3- -2.77"10-3(0.55"10-3)
Number of observations: 773
a) Only those results are reported which are relevant for the analysis in
subsequent sections.
Equations (2.13) and (2.14) have been estimated jointly, allowin~ for cor-
relation between en and un. A likelihood ratio test of the restriction that
the age function parameters T2 and 73 are identical in both the u- and ymin-
equation did not lead to rejection. This equality was therefore imposed.
Equality of the remainin~ parameters across the two equations was rejected
at the 5x-level by a likelihood ratio test.
The large standard errors of Q1, ó, á1, ~ are not necessarily disturb-
ing because one should consider the effects of a1 and ~(and of á1 and ~)
jointly. A closer inspection of the estimated values of ~1 and 6 reveals an
anomaly, however. For lar~e values of the welfare level a(2 0.7) and with
all vsriables in (2.15) set at their sample mean we find that an increase in
family size leads to a reduction in the poverty line. More generally, the
effects of family size on the cost of living of a family turn out to be
quite small. This result has been obtained more often and it has been
criticized as being implausible (e.g., by Watts [1985]). This problem will
be addressed in the next section.11
3. Measurement of Income
A central notion emerging from the previous Sections is that an in-
dividual's evaluation of income levels strongly depends on the level of his
own income. A complicating factor in this context is that people in general
only know approximately the level of their actual income. When answering the
income evaluation question and the minimum income question, the respondent
will take his estimate of his actual income as a frame of reference. Due to
the fact that in our survey household income is measured twice, however, we
are able to determine the biasing effects of the respondents' systematic er-
rors in "estimating" their own income.
The income evaluation question in the questionnaire is preceded by a
question which asks the respondent to indicate in which one of seven income
brackets net household income falls. It is likely that the income level the
respondent has in mind when answering this question is also the income level
he refers to when answering the subsequent income evaluation questions. The
last section of the questionnaire asks the respondent to provide detaíled
information on a large number of different components of the household's net
income, such as earned income, fringe benefits, family allowance, spouse's
income, etc.. The aggregate of these components is likely to provide a much
more reliable measure of the household's income. A comparison of the two in-
come measures suggests that respondents tend to underestimate household
income when answering the income class question; see Table 3.1.









a) Dfl. per year
b) Average income of all households in the income bracket according to the
second income measure12
In order to analyze the systematic difference between the two income
.
measures, we postulate the following relation between the income y uiiderly-
n
ing the answer to the income question in brackets and the income compone~~~s
y (i-1,..,m) recorded at the end of the questionnaire:
ni
„ n
(3.1) Yn - ~~laiyni).e n
where the ai's are unknown parameters and nn is a normally distributed error
:
term with zero mean and variance an. The n-th respondent's answer falls into
N
the i-th bracket if y is between the upper and lower bound of this bracket.
The values of ai are expected to lie in the unit interval. The smaller a
parameter ai, the more the respondent "forgets" the i-th income component
when answering the income question in brackets.
z
The parameters ai and an can be estimated by means of maximum
likelihood. The likelihood function is given by
~ logal-log(ïaiyni)






né0 1-~( a )
3 n13
where
nc61: if the n-th household's income falls into the first income
bracket
ne02: if the n-th household's income falls into the k-th income bracket
(k-2. . ,6)
ne03: if' the n-th household's income falls into the seventh income
bracket
ak . upper bound of the k-th income bracket
~(.) standard normal distribution function
and yni denotes the i-th income component of the n-th household.
The results of the maximum likelihood estimation of the parameters in model
(3.1) are presented in Table 3.2.
Table 3.2. Estimation results equation (3.1)
income component ai standard error
earned income of respondent from main occupation 0.99 0.01
holiday allowance plus fringes of respondent 0.60 0.11
rent subsidy plus income from subletting rooms 0.06 0.14
property income plus income from secondary jobs o.48 0.08
family allowance 0.1~ 0.09
income of the spouse 0.~7 0.04
income of oldest child of respondent 0.21 0.05
income of other household members 0.29 0.08
Number of observations: 811
Apparently, only the respondent's own earned income is fully taken into ac-
count when answering the income question in brackets. All other components
are to some extent "forgotten", especially rent subsidies and family
allowances.
We assume that if the respondent would have been aware of the actual
value of his household's income as measured by the sum of the income com-
ponents, the resulting values for eu and
ymin
would have been higher by the14




Thus, we adjust the
measured values of eu and
ymin
for each respondent as follows:
(3.3) epn - eun(~lyni,i~laiyni)
(3'4) ymin,n - ymin,n 3~lyni,i~laiyni)
u
where e n and ymin,n are the adjusted values for household n.
Subsequently, models (2.13)-(2.14) has been reestimated with un and
" "
lnymin,n replaced by u and ymin'
Tablè 3.3 gives some of the results.
Table 3.3. Estimation results after adjustment of u and lny-.
in
(st.andard errors in parentheses)









~ - 0.002 (0.07)
Number of observations: 77315
The earlier observed anomaly has disappeared. For a very wide range of
incomes, the estimates of d and ~1 imply an increase of the cost of living
when family size increases. These effects are presented in greater detail in
Section 5. Furthermore, it appears that T is not significantly different
from zero. Imposition of the constraint 4-0, yields the estimation results
reported in Table 3.4. (Since the results of this model will be used for the
construction of poverty lines, in Section 5, they are presented in more
detail than the previous ones). The estimates in Tables 3.3 and 3.4 are al-
most identical. A discussion of the economic interpretation of the estimates
is deferred to Section 5.
Table 3.4. Estimation results with ~-0














àE- 0.22 (0.0056) áu- 0.25 (0.0065)
~EU - 0.04 (0.002)
R2 - 0.59 R2 - 0.56
Number of observations: 77316
4. Sample Selectivity
Almost any empirical work based on micro-data is confronted with the
problem that a number of observations in the available sample cannot be used
in the analysis, because of missing information on one or more variables.
Usually, these observations are simply left out in the hope that the omitted
observations are more or less "random" with respect to the analysis. If the
number of deleted observations is relatively large, however, and the dropout
is connected with the endogenous variables of the model, the results might
be subject to selection bias.
To analyze this problem in more detail, we assume that the process by
which observations are removed from the sample can be described by a selec-
tion equation of the form:
M
(4.1) y3n - X3nn } ~n
M
The household is removed from the sample if y3n2 0 and retained otherwise.
The variables in X3n are thought to affect the selection probability of the
i-th householdl). We assume that En, un and vn follow a multivariate normal
distribution with zero mean and covariance matrix





`oEV ouv 1 ~
1) We assume that X3n is observed for all households.If the researcher ignores the possibility of selection bias, he simply
estimates (4.1) and (4.2) under the assumption that F.en-Eun-O. The expecta-
tir~n of thi~ error terms in (2.13) and (2.14), however, has to be Laken
conditionally on the household being retained (selected) in the sample, that
is
(4.3) E(enly3n~ 0) - E(enlvnC -X3nn)
(4.4) E(unlY3n~ ~) - E(unlvn~ -X3nn)
These expectations are generally unequal to zero. Consequently, ~1 and
~2 will be estimated inconsistently.
We will estimate the selection equation (4.1) jointly with (2.13) and
(2.14) and test whether selection bias is present, which is equivalent to
testing the null hypothesis
aEV-auv-0.
We will first give a verbal descrip-
tion of the selection process.
In the analysis of Section 2 and 3 a fairly large proportion of the ob-
servations could not be used due to deficient information with respect to
one of more variables. Zn 122 cases the respondent did not answer the MIQ or
provided insufficient information to estimate u, whereas in 145 cases net
household income could not be calculated due to insufficient information on
one or more income components. We assume that the selection of these 26~
households can be described by a single selection equation. Zn addition, 18
observations had to be left out because of various other deficiencies. Since
this latter selection pertains to a small number of observations only, we
ignore the possible selection bias that may result.18
In order to estimate equations (4.1), (2.13) and (2.14), we have to
choose a set of variables which are thought to affect the selection prob-
ability:
- constant term
- log age of respondent
- squared log age of respondent
- dummy variable - 1 if the respondent is an employed wage earner
- 0 otherwise
- dummy variable - 1 if the respondent is a higher executive of a firm
- 0 otherwise
The likelihood function of the observations for model (2.13), (2.14),
(4.1) is given by:
(4.6) L -nÉ00-7 fn(Y1,y2,Y3)dY3.nÉ01 O f3n(Y3)dY3
wtiere nc0~ if the housc~hold is retained in the sample,
ne01 if the household is removed from the sample,
fn(.) is the joint normal distribution function of (yl,y2,y3) and
f3n(.) is the marginal distribution function of y3, for the n-th household.
The estimation results are presented in Table 4.1. For comparison we also
show the estimates from Section 3.19
Table 4.1. Results of joint estimation of equations (2.13), (2.14), (4.1)
standard estimate from standard
parameter estimate error Table 3.4 error
~0 2.86 0.41 2.72 0.41
al 1.68 0.69 1.92 0.78
~2 0.55 0.05 0.58 0.05
d -0.13 0.06 -0.15 0.07
~3 0.14 0.04 0.13 0.04
Y2 0.185~`l0-2 0.012 0.235"10-2 0.012
Y3 -0.80"10-4 0.0003 -0.117~10-3 O.ooo3
a0 3.23 0.39 3.16 0.39
al 0.39 0.04 0.43 0.04
a2 0.43 0.03 0.45 0.03











aE 0.27 0.009 0.22 0.006
ou 0.28 0.010 0.25 0.007
oEU o.06 0.005 0.04 0.002
aE~ 0.24 0.012
ou~ 0.18 0.025
Although the differences between the first two and the last two columns
in Table 4.1 are generally small, a likelihood ratio test strongly rejects
the null hypothesis a -a -0.
ev uv
Furthermore, it appears that the probability of being removed from the
sample increases with age. For example, the probability for a 25 year old
respondent is 0.11 on average, whereas it rises to 0.48 for a 55 year old
respondent. The probability of being removed from the sample also increases
if the respondent is a higher executive.20
5 Poverty Lines
To obtain a better feeling for the importance of the issues dealt with
in the previous Sections we compare the poverty lines implied by the three
models of Sections 2, 3, and 4. First the age functions f(a~) for each of
the three models are considered. These have been drawn in Fig. 5.1.
The age function for the model of Section 2, illustrates the implausible
results obtained on the basis of the incorrect income measures. The age
functions for both other models do not differ widely, and both look
plausible. The preferred model, with correction for sample selectivity,
shows somewhat less steep age effects than the model of Section 3.
weiqht rela- ~ ~
tive to adult ~
Figure 5.1 Age functions for three models
Next we illustrate how the cost of an extra child varies with income and
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Figure 5.2 Cost of an additional child as a function of income, for various
family compositions
Fig. 5.2 shows that the cost of the extra child, that is the youngest child
in the family, increases with income but less than proportionally.
Furthermore, there are substantial economies of scale. For instance, the
two-year old child costs considerably less in the six person family than in
the four person family (see cases III and IV). Older children cost more than
young children. Despite the economies of scale due to a large family, the
eleven-year old child in case II costs more than the two-year old child in
case III.
Finally, we have computed poverty lines for some selected family com-
positions based on the three models for the SPL and two versions of the LPL
(a-0.4 and a-0.5) (see Table 5). In the calculation of the poverty lines
both mn and hsn have been set equal to the sample means of log-íncome and
log-family size, respectively. The standard errors in parentheses are based
on an asymptotic approximation, which follows straightforwardly from the
fact that the poverty lines are differentiable functions of the parameters.
For comparison, the last column of Table 5.1. gives the money amounts that
correspond to the official poverty line in The Netherlands at the time of
the survey.22
Table 5.1. Poverty lines for various family compositions, according to three
models (Dfl. x 100)
model of Section 2 model of Section 3
(correction for income
Family measurement errors)
composition SPL LPL(0.4) LPL(0.5) SPL LPL(0.4) LPL(0.5)
1 adult 116(1) 137(9) 167(9) 130(6) 153(7) 180(8)
2 adults 160(6) 185(5) 211(5) 175(7) 202(6) 235(6)
2 adultst6 130(9) 153(9) 182(9) 195(7) 221(6) 258(7)
2 adultstl2 157(7) 182(6) 208(6) 204(7) 229(7) 265(7)
2 adultst12,6 136(il) 159(11) 188(l0) 220(9) 243(8) 280(8)
2 adultst12,6,1 144(10) 168(1) 196(l0) 229(9) 251(8) 289(9)
2 adultst18,12,6,1 169(8) 195(7) 220(7) 254(11) 270(9) 310(10)




model of Section 4 official
(correction for sample poverty
selection bias) line
SPL LPL(0.4) LPL(0.5)
1 adult 117(6) 132(7) 154(7)
2 adults 154(6) 171(6) 198(7)
2 adultst6 174(7) 190(7) 219(7)
2 adultstl2 178(7) 194(7) 223(7)
2 adultst12,6 195(8) 208(8) 238(8)
2 adultst12,6,1 207(9) 218(9) 249(9)
2 adultst18,12,6,1 225(10) 232(10) 265(10)









The official poverty line exceeds the amounts based on the model of
Section 2. This model also suggests substantial economies of scale for large
families, that is the estimated poverty lines increase very slowly with an
increase in family size and sometimes even decrease (compare, for instance,
two adults and two adults with a six-year old child). These findings are
typical for the results that have been obtained in earlier studies. See, for
example, Goedhart et al. [1977], Colasanto, Kapteyn, Van der Gasg [1984].
(In these studies a negative weight for certain ages was not observed,
simply because no weighing on the basis of age took place).
The model of Section 3 yields quite a different picture. The level of
the SPL corresponds roughly with the official poverty line and both versions23
of the LPL exceed the official poverty line. The economies of scale for a
large family also look more plausible than in the previous model.
The most striking outcome of the model of Section 4 is that the correc-
tion for sample selectivity bias leads to a downward revision of
approximately 10 percent of the level of the poverty line as compared with
the results of the model of Section 3. As a result we see that the official
poverty line is generally high enough to allow households to make ends meet.
Furthermore, economies of scale are plausible. They are a little larger than
implied by the official poverty line.
6. Conclusions
Since income is the central concept in most social security and welfare
policies, the implementation of any poverty line definition should be based
on an accurate measurement of household income. As the subjective poverty
line definitions try to elicit directly which income level is necessary to
make ends meet or to guarantee a certain welfare level, it is important that
respondents have an accurate knowledge of their income. For the purpose of
questionnaire design, this yields two alternatives. The first alternative is
the procedure adopted in this paper, where the subjective questions are
preceded by a question which measures the respondent's perception of his own
after tax household income. On the basis of an accurate measurement of in-
come later in the questionnaire, one can then adjust the response to the
subjective questions. A second alternative is to begin with a large number
of factual questions about household income, total the components and only
then pose the subjective questions.
The finding that sample selectivity creates a significant problem is not
surprising. The poor tend to have characteristics that give them a lower
probability of participation in surveys. Correction for sample selectivity
is important to avoid policies that are simed at the poor, but which are
mainly based on observations from a middle class population.
The poverty lines discussed here, are based on an explicit model of
determinants of subjective evaluations. It appears that aJL poverty line
will be based on some implicit or explicit model of behavior or valuation.24
To construct an internally consistent or reliable poverty line, the model on
which it is based should be correctly specified. The model (2.13)-(2.14)
used in this paper is misspecified, because, due to the lack of adequate
data, the influence of lagged variables had to be ignored. Hence, the em-
pirical results should not be taken too seriously. The poverty lines that
are discussed here require both panel dats and a questionnaire design that
allows for an accurate treatment of one of the crucial variables in social
policy: income.25
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